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ABSTRACT 
This paper's point of departure is that low-quality institutions, concentration of political 
power, and underdevelopment are persistent over time.  Its analytical model views an equal 
distribution of political power as a commitment device to enhance institutional quality 
thereby promoting growth.  The politically powerful coalition contemplates relinquishing of 
its power, weighing this advantageous consequence against the limit on own appropriative 
ability that it entails.  The possibility of two developmental paths is exhibited: with 
concentration of political and economic power, low-quality institutions, and slow growth; and 
a more equal distribution of political and economic resources, high-quality institutions, and 
faster growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Whereas the broad importance of institutions for economic development seems to have been 
firmly established in recent work, see Acemoglu et al., 2005, for a comprehensive account, 
much less is known about their determinants.  In contrast, the reality of underdevelopment 
begs for enhancement of such understanding.  In other words, what prevents societies from 
adopting superior institutions and why so many less developed countries seem to be stuck in 
a bad equilibrium with poor institutions and poor economic outcomes? 
 One observation is that the commitment to high-quality institutions should be real. In 
other words, it is important to distinguish between statutory, de jure, institutions and their in 
practice implementation; sustainability of good institutions hinges upon the latter.  Many 
failed states have adopted decent, sometimes even exemplary, institutions de jure, and the 
wording of the constitutions generally little differs across countries, almost all emphasizing to 
various degrees universal values, such as equality, rights, justice etc.1    Indeed, there are 
many appealing constitutions in developing countries, which were often inspired by advanced 
European and American constitutional theories and convey similar sentiments; yet, these 
countries often times represent examples of utter developmental failures associated with 
particularly poor institutions in practice and high levels of material and political inequalities.2   
 This suggests that merely a blueprint is not enough and that the de facto 
implementation may be of an even greater importance in the context of institutional 
                                                          
1
 A cursory review of constitutions in a sample of countries reveals many common themes although some as in 
the US emphasize individual freedoms and rights, whereas many other countries – advanced as well as 
developing ones - putting additional emphasis on equality, in particular, with respect to access to public 
services; see http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ for a useful information source in this regard. 
2
 One stark case is that of Liberia whose governance system was modeled after the one in the United States; 
another equally revealing one is that of Haiti, whose constitution borrows from the French one.  Additionally, 
the Stalinist constitution of 1936 (in particular, its article 125) that supposedly formed the background for the 
Soviet Union’s  legal system until the country’s extensively provides for individual rights as well as for the self 
determination of the federal sub-units. Likewise, in Iraq under Saddam Hussein: "Private ownership and 
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development.  In other words, the understanding of the factors that provide incentives to 
societies to maintain high-quality institutions is the key.  Some recent work has started 
addressing these issues. One line of research attempts to answer this set of questions by 
recognizing that institutions – in addition to their aggregate effects – entail redistributive 
consequences.  This implies that growth enhancing institutions benefit some groups of 
individuals – but potentially at the expense of others.  If the latter wield political influence, 
superior institutions may not be adopted despite their overall growth enhancing potential.  
According to this approach, the distribution of political power is an important determinant of 
institutional quality, see Acemoglu, 2005, for argumentation along these lines.  Thus, 
democracy, with its relatively equal distribution of political power, often emerges in this line 
of thinking as a political system that is more amenable to better institutional quality than an 
oligarchy with its concentration of political power – see Acemoglu, 2003, and Gradstein, 
2007. 
 This paper’s point of departure is that economic factors as well as the concentration of 
political power, may play a role in determining institutional quality, hence have 
developmental consequences.  To focus on these, we deliberately regard the concentration of 
political power to a large extent as endogenous and focus on the concentration of economic 
resources, specifically, income inequality.  While decisions on institutional quality are 
political, only income inequality affects the outcome in this regard, whereby the rich are less 
interested in high-quality institutions than the poor.  More importantly, we consider a rational 
political determination of institutional quality assuming that an ex ante commitment does not 
have much bite, hence, is ruled out.  Instead, it is determined ex post individual economic 
decisions, which are made in correct anticipation of implemented institutional quality.  
Institutional quality has two principal effects.  On the one hand, it induces higher overall 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
economic individual liberty are guaranteed according to the law…" and “Equal opportunities are guaranteed to 
all citizens, according to the law."  (Iraq’s 1990 constitution, articles 16b and 19b respectively).   
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investment and faster income growth; on the other hand, by restricting the ability of the rich 
to engage in successful appropriation, it distributes the fruits of this growth more equally. 
 An exogenously given political bias in conjunction with income inequality determines 
the composition of the decisive political coalition.  While this coalition is unable to directly 
precommit to institutional quality, it can democratize thereby creating an indirect 
commitment by tilting the balance of political power toward a coalition more favorable to 
institutions.  In deciding whether or not to do so, it weighs the benefits of better institutional 
quality for aggregate investment versus a lesser share of the generated income it is able to 
appropriate. In our setting, if the political bias is substantial, income inequality and poor 
institutional quality may reinforce each other, potentially generating different developmental 
paths.  Low level of inequality, high institutional quality, and rapid growth are the features of 
the good equilibrium, and high inequality, low institutional quality, and slow growth are 
obtained in the bad equilibrium.  The existence of these developmental paths means that poor 
institutional quality and backward economic development can be persistent.  Without creating 
favorable economic conditions – in this instance, through a reduction in income inequality – 
development is unlikely to emerge from the low equilibrium.  This is consistent with the 
often failed attempts to import some constitutional features from advanced countries to 
developing ones, without introducing parallel changes in economic incentives to support 
these features, such as land reform or strong public education.   
 This paper is related to several literatures.  Its motives are related to the literature on 
the political determinants of development, such as in Olson, 1993, Acemoglu, 2003, and 
Acemoglu, 2005.3  More specifically related is Sonin, 2003, who offers a model where 
income inequality leads to the subversion of institutional quality; important historical work, 
summarized in Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000, brings forth similar ideas by contrasting the 
                                                          
3
 A somewhat dissenting view, that economic development eventually leads to the adoption of superior 
institutions, is presented in Galor and Moav, 2006.   
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developmental patterns of New World’s colonies.  Jack and Lagunoff, 2006, and Cervellati et 
al., 2005, 2006, discuss democratization incentives, and Lagunoff, 2006a, 2006b, contain a 
general model introducing the stability of political institutions. Gonzalez and Neary, 2004, 
study the impact of rent seeking on the biased incidence of public spending in a growth 
model that shares some features with the one presented below.  Neither of these papers, 
however, exhibits institutional and developmental traps whereby growth, income inequality, 
and political bias are all jointly determined.4  In Gradstein, 2007, the possibility of such traps 
is presented in a related albeit somewhat narrower setting, but its relationship to the politico-
economic conditions is not made fully transparent.  Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, in a 
related work, present a model of institutional traps carefully distinguishing between their 
political and economic determinants; but theirs is not an explicitly growth model.  Finally, 
this paper shares with Rajan and Zingales, 2006, the emphasis on the primacy of the political 
and economic fundamentals over formal institutions, although its modeling details are 
different. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section reviews some basic facts 
about development traps in their relation to institutions.  Section 3 presents then the analytical 
framework, which is followed in Section 4 by the basic equilibrium analysis that takes the 
distribution of political power, represented by the political bias, as exogenously given.  
Section 5 endogenizes the determination of the political bias identifying conditions under 
which the ruling elite will be prepared to relegate political power to the masses as the means 
of committing to better institutions.  Section 6 contains a dynamic analysis exhibiting the 
possibility of convergence to different steady states, Section 7 discusses the assumptions and 
the implications, and Section 8 concludes with brief remarks. 
 
                                                          
4
 Although the work surveyed in Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000, informally suggests this possibility. 
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2. Motivation 
To motivate the paper’s argument, we now review some evidence on developmental traps in 
their relation to institutional quality.  Economic development is often measured by outcomes 
such as income per capita or its growth, as well as associated attainment in the areas of 
health, education, infrastructure etc.  Yet, these outcomes are known to be highly correlated 
with additional factors, in particular, measures of institutional quality.  Thus, the correlations 
between income per capita across countries and measures of institutional quality range 
between 0.65-0.78.  High income countries also seem to be more committed to a more 
egalitarian distribution of economic resources as can be judged by measures of income 
inequality: the correlations between income per capita and institutional quality on the one 
hand and measures of income inequality on the other hand are around -0.40, see Chong and 
Gradstein, 2006, for a more detailed account of the relationship between inequality and 
institutional quality.  A great variety of institutional quality measures have been developed in 
recent years using somewhat different approaches.  For example, Kaufmann et al., 2005, have 
constructed aggregate measures of governance for 209 countries and territories for five recent 
years, including voice and accountability; political instability and violence; government 
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption.  The correlations 
between these measures are very high, typically exceeding 0.80; moreover, similarly high 
correlations are to be found between these measures and the ones generated by the ICRG risk 
rating system.  All these measures are in turn also highly correlated with measures of 
democracy – either based on Freedom House (2005) or Gastil index, the respective 
correlations exceeding 0.60. 
 Further, there is a great deal of persistence in various development-associated 
 7  
indicators.  Incomes and growth rates have received the most attention in this regard.5  But 
the persistence of income inequality has also been noticed in the literature.  Thus, Li et al., 
1998, show that inequality is fairly stable across time and most of its variation is due to cross-
country differences.  Expanding and updating their data, the author’s calculations show that 
simple correlations in the Gini coefficients calculated over five year periods in, say, early 
1970s and the end of 1990’s exceed 0.60.  Likewise, there exists a similar degree of 
persistence in institutional indicators.  Thus, the ones based on the ICRG – the only source of 
a panel data – exhibit measures of persistence of the same order of magnitude, with 
correlations between 0.60-0.70.  Moreover, intertemporal institutional quality tends to 
correlate with income inequality as argued more in detail in Chong and Gradstein, 2006. 
 All this suggests that underdevelopment is a multifaceted phenomenon that is 
manifested through many observable factors, which tend to persist over time.  Important 
recent work has tried to disentangle the causality relationships between some of these factors.  
Notably, much effort went into showing that institutions have a causal effect on development, 
and some representative work in this vein is mentioned above.  Inasmuch as this work is a 
significant step forward in its econometric sophistication, as revealed in Glaeser et al., 2004, 
it is still unable to fully separate the effect of institutions from other factors such as human 
capital.  Additionally, there is the possibility of a reverse relationship as well, that 
development somehow leads to better institutions.6  Thus, viewing underdevelopment as an 
institutional trap that is affected by the distribution of resources as is suggested below is 
consistent with the available evidence.   
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 See Pritchett, 1997; however, Sala-i-Martin, 2005, presents a dissenting view. 
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3. The framework 
Economic environment.  Consider an economy populated by a measure one of households 
indexed by i, each consisting of a parent and child, operating in discrete time t.  The initial 
level of household i's income is exogenously given at yi0, and the income level in period t, yit, 
is determined endogenously.  The initial income distribution is given, F0, and the 
distributions in subsequent periods, Ft, are endogenously determined in a way specified more 
in detail below.  In each period, the households' income is allocated between consumption, 
productive investment, and investment in appropriative activity or rent seeking.  The role of 
the latter is to affect the distributional incidence of the publicly provided good. 
Specifically, the individuals allocate resources between consumption, cit, productive 
investment, kit+1, and unproductive investment in lobbying or rent seeking, rit+1; normalizing 
all prices to one, the budget constraint then is 
yit = cit + kit+1 + rit+1 (1) 
 
Thus, the individuals are credit constrained, which will play a crucial role in the analysis 
below implying, in particular, that richer individuals expend more resources on rent seeking 
than poorer ones. 
 Investment is taxed, and the proceeds are used to produce a publicly provided good.7 
Letting Tt+1 denote the tax rate, Gt+1 the amount of the publicly provided good, and Kt+1 the 
aggregate amount of investment, the government’s budget constraint is: 
 Gt+1 = Tt+1 Kt+1  (2) 
  
 The incorporation of publicly provided goods in growth models has been inspired by 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6
 See Galor and Moav, 2006, for interesting recent work in this regard. 
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Barro, 1990.  It reflects the idea that productive publicly provided goods such as 
infrastructure and education are crucial for successful development, see World Bank 
Development Report, 1997, for an account.  Unlike this earlier literature, it is assumed, 
however, that the incidence of the publicly provided good can be affected by individual 
households who expend resources on rent seeking to this end.8  In this sense, the approach 
adopted here is similar to Gonzalez and Neary, 2004.  Indeed, there is much evidence that the 
incidence of publicly provided goods, far from uniform, is skewed toward the rich.  Le 
Grand, 1982, for example, documents this in many areas of public intervention in the UK, 
such as health, infrastructure, and education, and the World Bank Development Report, 2001, 
exhibits similar picture for developing countries.  More recent research provides detailed 
evidence on the non-uniform incidence of public spending, see Olken, 2005, and Reinikka 
and Svensson, 2004.  (The latter paper especially also notes that this unequal incidence is 
related to the differences in political influence across income groups.)   
 The extent to which an individual household can affect the incidence of public 
spending is given by the level of institutional quality, represented by the parameter Qt+1, 
which is endogenously determined by collective decision making detailed below.9  In 
particular, the accrued share to household i share of extent of the publicly provided good is 
 
git+1 =  
∫
−
+
−
+
+
+
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
djr
r
t
t
Q
jt
Q
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 Gt+1    (3) 
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 Assuming that taxes are levied on current income instead does not change anything in substance. 
8
 Virtually identical results are obtained if rent seeking is done over an available resource such as a natural 
resource instead of a publicly provided good (Chong and Gradstein, 2006), or when rent seeking redistributes 
income as in Sonin, 2003; the specific modelling choice here was driven by the importance of publicly provided 
goods for growth as pointed out in Barro, 1990, along with their biased incidence as discussed above. 
9
 Conceptual issues with defining institutions as opposed to policies are well known, see Glaeser et al., 2004.  
Here, the choice of institutional quality sets the rules of the game by implicitly determining the propensity to 
engage in wasteful rent seeking investment. 
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Larger values of Qt+1, 0 < Qt+1 < 1, make the allocation of the incidence benefits more equal 
by decreasing the marginal productivity of rent seeking, whereas smaller values make the 
distribution of the benefits more responsive to an individual rent seeking effort.   An 
egalitarian access to publicly provided goods in many cases constitutes a part of a country’s 
constitution; in other cases, the constitutionally guaranteed equality of opportunity can often 
be interpreted as such.  The specification in (3) follows Sonin, 2003, and Chong and 
Gradstein, 2006.  While very convenient, this single parameter specification of institutional 
quality is clearly a first approximation reduced form.  Future work should address the 
complexity of conceptualization of institutional quality and its microeconomic determination 
much more in detail.  Glaeser et al., 2003, is one interesting recent effort in this direction.  It 
is shown there how large inequalities provide the rich with an opportunity to subvert the court 
system.  Another potentially useful direction is given in Dal Bo and Di Tella, 2003 (see also 
references therein), where threats are used by organized interest groups to apply pressure on 
elected politicians; in equilibrium, this may lead to low quality political leaders being elected. 
 The after-tax portion of the investment along with the individually accrued benefits 
from the publicly provided good are used to generate next-period income, yit+1.  Specifically, 
the production function is 
 
yit+1 = A εit+1 [(1- Tt+1)kit+1]β git+1,   A  > 0,  0 < β < 1  (4) 
 
where εit+1 are interpreted as individual specific shocks such as innate abilities.  They are 
assumed to be i.i.d. and uncorrelated with initial income.   
 
 
Each parent's preferences derive from current private consumption and from the child’s 
income.  Assuming for simplicity symmetric logarithmic preferences, we write the expected 
utility: 
 11  
 
 u(cit,  yit+1) = ln(cit) + ln(yit+1) (5) 
 
This assumption captures the "warm glow" motive for intergenerational transfers and has been 
often used in the related literature.  It greatly simplifies the analysis by disregarding the potential 
for the parents to manipulate the political environment in the children generation. 
 The above assumptions, including the logarithmic specification, enable the derivation of 
closed form solutions below.  As will be seen more clearly later, they, in particular, imply that 
individual decisions are independent of abilities.  The main results, however, most crucially 
depend on the fact that rent seeking is a waste, which would be eliminated if the individuals 
were able to write complete allocation contracts. 
   
Political system.  The political process guiding collective choices is assumed to be shaped by the 
households exerting influence on the outcome and is biased in favor of the rich.  This is done 
through a weighting measure w(y), w : [0, ∞) → [0, 1].  For example, under the commonly used 
in earlier centuries voting franchise rule, w assigns the value of zero to all individuals with 
income below y and the value of 1/[1-F(y)] to all individuals with income above y.  A weighted 
majority rule then specifies the political equilibrium as the Condorcet winner given the 
weighting scheme.  As will be shown below, monotonicity of policy preferences with respect to 
incomes implies that a policy preferred by (weighted) median voter emerges as such 
equilibrium.  A reduction in the political bias simply implies that a poorer individual becomes 
politically decisive.10   
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 One possible formalization of this view is given by stipulating a weighting voting scheme, where the weights 
are positively related to incomes, see the appendix. 
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 Note that this generalization enables us to treat democratization as encompassing a 
variety of channels of political influence, not just voting franchise.11  Its other advantage is 
related to the fact that the empirical literature typically uses proxies of democracies based on 
outcomes such as civil liberties and freedoms, not on procedures such as measures of the 
voting franchise - which likely reflects the skepticism as to the extent to which procedural 
details of voting rights are indeed related to democratic processes.  We will somewhat loosely 
interpret a reduction in the political bias – hence the increase in the political power of the 
poor - as democratization; subsequently, a more specific weighting scheme will be introduced 
to study the economy’s dynamics.12   
 
 
4. Equilibrium analysis: Policy commitment   
We assume that, in each period, decisions on the tax rate and on the institutional quality are 
taken first, and then the individuals allocate their incomes.  The analysis proceeds backward 
starting with the allocation decisions for a given tax rate and institutional quality. 
 
4.1. Rent seeking and investment 
In each period for a given level of political inequality, investment decisions, and institutional 
constraints on rent seeking, the individual rent seeking levels are determined.  An individual 
household determines the allocation of resources so as to maximize the utility (5) and given 
the constraints (1)-(4).  The first order conditions with respect to rit+1 and kit+1 are 
 
                                                          
11
 For some evidence linking incomes with political activism see Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993, and Verba et al., 
1978.   
12
 Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, carefully distinguish between formal voting rights and informal political 
influence in determining the de facto distribution of political power.  We abstract here from these 
 13  
-1/(yit - kit+1 - rit+1) + (1-Qt+1)/ rit+1 = 0  (6) 
and 
-1/(yit - kit+1 - rit+1) + β/ kit+1 = 0 (7) 
 
 Combining (1), (6) and (7) and aggregating we obtain the following equilibrium values: 
 
kit+1 = βyit/(2-Qt+1+β),  rit+1 = (1-Qt+1)yit/(2-Qt+1+β), cit = yit/(2-Qt+1+β), 
Kt+1 = βYt/(2-Qt+1+β)    (8) 
 
where Yt denotes the average income in period t; note that dKt+1/dQt+1 = βYt/(2-Qt+1+β)2 > 0 – 
higher institutional quality enhances investment.     
 This implies that the next-period level of the publicly provided good, its incidence, 
and next-period income are respectively given as follows: 
 
Gt+1 = Tt+1 βYt/(2-Qt+1+β),  git+1 = [Tt+1 βYt/(2-Qt+1+β)] yit 11 +− tQ / ∫ − +
1
0
1 1djy tQjt  
yit+1 = A εit+1 (1- Tt+1)β[βyit/(2-Qt+1+β)]β {[Tt+1βYt/(2-Qt+1+β)] yit 11 +− tQ / ∫ − +
1
0
1 1djy tQjt } (9) 
 
Note that the level of the publicly provided good increases with the level of institutional 
quality, Qt+1.  Additionally, future income is a concave function of the current income if Qt+1 
> β; is a convex function of the current income if Qt+1 < β; and is a linear function if Qt+1 =β.   
A better institutional quality channels resources away from rent seeking and into productive 
investment.  By limiting the comparative advantage of the rich in rent seeking, it also implies 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
microfoundations assuming that the distribution of political weights determined the de facto distribution of 
political power. 
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a more egalitarian distribution of the incidence of the publicly provided good. 
 Also note that the assumption on logarithmic preferences ensures that the preferred 
tax rate to finance this good is identical across the individuals both within and across 
generations, namely, Tt+1 = T = 1/(1+β).13 Abstracting from a deeper analysis of the 
determination of the level of the publicly provided good facilitates focusing on institutional 
quality.14   
 It will be convenient at this point to make further assumptions on the distribution of 
income and of the random ability shock.  In particular suppose that, initially, ln(yi0) has a 
normal distribution with the parameters µ0 and σ02, and that ln(εit) is in each period normally 
distributed with the mean of zero and the variance of φ2.15  From (9), this implies that all 
subsequent distributions of income will also be lognormal, say, with the parameters µt and σt2; 
so that  
 
 ln(yit+1) = ln{A (1- T)β[β/(2-Qt+1+β)]β [TβYt/(2-Qt+1+β)]} + ln(εit+1) + 
 (1+β-Qt+1)ln(yit) – ln[ ∫ − +
1
0
1 1djy tQjt ] =  
 ln{A (1- Tt)β[β/(2-Qt+1+β)]β [TβYt/(2-Qt+1+β)]} + ln(εit+1) + 
 (1+β-Qt+1)ln(yit) – [(1- Qt+1) µt + (1- Qt+1)2σt2/2] (10) 
 
with the recursively determined parameters  
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 This is because, in general, two factors affect the demand for this good here.  First, as poorer individuals 
benefit less from the publicly provided good, they demand less of it.  On the other hand, poorer individuals tend 
to prefer a larger tax which has a redistributive nature: while poorer individuals pay lower taxes, they stand to 
benefit from the publicly provided good alongside with the richer individuals.  Logarithmic preferences imply 
that these two countervailing factors cancel each other leading to identical demand for the publicly provided 
good.   
14
 Consideration of the possibility where a fraction of tax revenues is used to provide a public good and another 
fraction is used for income redistribution would complicate the analysis significantly, but would be unlikely to 
qualitatively change the results.  Intuitively, a larger inequality would cause an increase in direct redistribution 
and a decrease in public provision of the productive good, thus reinforcing the results. 
15
 This restriction is, in fact, redundant for some of the results below. 
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 µt+1 = ln{A (1- T)β[β/(2-Qt+1+β)]β [TβYt/(2-Qt+1+β)]} +  
 (1+β-Qt+1) µt – [(1- Qt+1) µt + (1- Qt+1)2σt2/2] =  
 ln{A (1- T)β[β/(2-Qt+1+β)]β [TβYt/(2-Qt+1+β)]} + βµt – (1- Qt+1)2σt2/2 (11) 
and 
 σt+12 = (1+β-Qt+1)2 σt2 + φ2   (12) 
 
Income variance increases over time when the level of institutional quality is sufficiently 
small, for example, when Qt+1 < β, and, depending on the variance in innate abilities, 
decreases over time when it is high enough.  We will assume that φ2 is relatively large, so that, 
in particular, σt2 > (2+β)/(1+β)2.  
 Also, we define a measure of intergenerational income mobility as the complement to 
one of the intertemporal correlation in (logarithms of) incomes, γt+1 = 1 – Corr (ln(yit+1), 
ln(yit)).  Simple yet cumbersome calculations establish then that γt+1 increases in Qt+1, 
implying that institutional quality enhances intergenerational income mobility.16  Moreover, 
next-period average income is 
 
 Yt+1 = A (φ2/2) T(1- T)β[β/(2-Qt+1+β)]1+β Yt ∫ −+ +
1
0
1 1tQ
jty
β dj/ ∫ − +
1
0
1 1djy tQjt  (13) 
 
and the economy’s growth rate is 
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 Here is a brief sketch of the argument.  Letting Exp denote the aggregation operator over the households 
measure and recalling that abilities and incomes are uncorrelated, we obtain: 
γt+1 = 1 – Corr (ln(yit+1), ln(yit)) = 1 – Cov(ln(yit+1), ln(yit))/σt+1 σt = 1 – Exp [(lnyit+1 - µt+1) (lnyit - µt)]/σt+1 σt =  
1 – Exp[lnεit+1 (lnyit - µt)]/σt+1 σt - (1+β-Qt+1) Exp (lnyit - µt)2/σt+1 σt = 
1 – Exp (lnεit+1) Exp (lnyit - µt)]/σt+1 σt - (1+β-Qt+1) σt2/[(1+β-Qt+1)2 σt2 + φ2]1/2 σt = 
1 - 1/[1 + φ2/(1+β-Qt+1)2 σt2]1/2, which increases in Qt+1.   
 
 16  
 Yt+1 / Yt = A (φ2/2)T(1- T)β[β/(2-Qt+1+β)]1+β ∫ −+ +
1
0
1 1tQ
jty
β dj/ ∫ − +
1
0
1 1djy tQjt  = 
A(φ2/2)T(1-T)β[β/(2-Qt+1+β)]1+β [(1+β-Qt+1)µt+(1+β-Qt+1)2σt2]/ [(1-Qt+1)µt+(1-Qt+1)2σt2] (14) 
 
and differentiation of (14) establishes that the economy’s growth rate increases with 
institutional quality.  Note that our assumptions imply neutrality of the growth rate with 
respect to exogenous allocations of the benefits from the publicly provided good across the 
individuals; this focuses attention on the waste inherent in rent seeking efforts to skew its 
incidence.17   
 Collecting the results, we obtain 
  
Proposition 1.  A higher level of institutional quality induces a larger amount of the publicly 
provided good, a larger level of investment, a larger degree of intergenerational income 
mobility, and faster income growth, as well as decreases income dispersion.18 
 
In particular, note that a better institutional quality prevents diversion of resources away from 
investment thus increasing the rate of economic growth.  This is consistent with the recent 
literature that finds a direct causal effect of institutional quality on growth (see Acemoglu et 
al., 2005, for a review).  Further note that rent seeking here is a waste.  Thus, it can be shown 
that for any given equilibrium, an alternative allocation can be devised whereby rent seeking 
is prohibited, and the publicly provided good is allocated such as to make all individuals 
better off; an implicit assumption, however, is that incomplete contracting renders such 
scenario impossible.   Where rent seeking cannot be ex ante eliminated through an effective 
contract, it is ex post regulated through the political choice of the institutional quality 
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 A more general formulation would consider interactions between individual abilities and the incidence 
allocation; but from our perspective, this would unduly complicate the analysis. 
 17  
parameter, to whose determination we now proceed. 
 
4.2. Institutional quality 
To determine the political outcome of voting on institutional quality, we first examine the 
individually optimal decisions in this regard.  Utility maximization while employing the 
envelope theorem, yields the preferred level of institutional quality for an individual 
household, which is given by the following first order condition: 
 
(2+β)/(2-Qt+1+β) - ln(yit) + ∫ − +
1
0
1 )ln(1 djyy jtQjt t / ∫ − +
1
0
1 1djy tQjt =  
(2+β)/(2-Qt+1+β) - ln(yit) + µt + (1- Qt+1)σt2 = 0,  0 < Qt+1 < 1 (15a) 
1 - ln(yit) + µt + σt2 < 0,  Qt+1 = 0 (15b) 
(2+β)/(1+β) - ln(yit) + µt > 0,  Qt+1 = 1 (15c) 
 
The derivative of the left-hand side in (15a), (2+β)/(2-Qt+1+β)2 - σt2, increases in Qt+1; and 
when Qt+1=1, it equals (2+β)/(1+β)2 - σt2, which is negative by assumption.  It then follows that 
the second condition holds, (15) admits a unique root, and the preferences are single peaked.  
Differentiation establishes then that the preferred level of institutional quality decreases with 
individual income; further, the political equilibrium – given, as recalled, by the weighted 
majority rule - exists and is determined by the preferences of the weighted majority voter, say 
ydt, with ydt replacing yit in (15).  Recalling our definition of the political bias, we then obtain 
that the larger is the political bias the higher is the decisive voter’s income, hence the lower is 
the preferred level of institutional quality.19 
 Summarizing, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
18
 In a related context, similar results are derived in Sonin, 2003. 
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Proposition 2.  There is a negative relationship between the political bias and the preferred by 
the decisive voter level of institutional quality.  
 
The key for the above result is the negative relationship between individual income and the 
preferred level of institutional quality.  This follows because richer individuals have a 
comparative advantage in rent seeking, so that public enforcement limiting rent seeking acts 
against their interests. 
 Combining Proposition 1 and 2, it follows that a larger political bias has negative 
consequences for investment, income growth, and income inequality.   In other words, when the 
decisive coalition consists of a narrow group of rich elite, they will tend to subvert institutions 
sacrificing overall growth to appropriate a larger share of the accumulated investment through 
rent seeking.  This proposition, therefore, identifies the distribution of political power as an 
important determinant of institutional quality.  We then proceed to study how this political 
power evolves over time. 
 
 
5. Political power 
Suppose now that the possibility of a direct commitment to institutional quality in each 
generation is ruled out.  In other words, the individual allocations decisions in each period 
necessarily precede the determination of institutional quality.  However, the existing 
politically decisive coalition, referred to the ruling elite, may relinquish its power and 
democratize.  This constitutes the essence of the analysis that follows.  Indeed, as emphasized 
in Olson, 1993, commitments to institutional quality, such as restraining from expropriation 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
19
 For presentational simplicity, the ensuing analysis focuses on the case of internal solutions. 
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or law enforcement, should not be taken for granted, in particular, in the context of oligarchic 
regimes.  It is, in fact, often argued that an important role of the political system is to restrict 
the ruler’s capacity to make bad institutional choices, see North and Weingast, 1989. 
 Specifically, the assumed sequence of events is now as follows.  The economy begins 
a period with a given distribution of income and with a given political bias.  It will be now 
convenient to be more specific about the nature of the political bias.  In particular, suppose 
that the political weight of an individual household is a properly normalized exponential 
function of its income; the exponent, bt, 0 < bt < 1, represents the extent of the political bias, 
whereby the case of bt = 0 corresponds to full democracy.  It is not difficult to show that the 
identity of the decisive voter is then given by: ln(ydt) = µt + btσt2; for example, under full 
democracy, bt = 0, the median income voter, ymt, is decisive (see Benabou, 2000, for a more 
complete derivation in a related context).   
 First, the voters determine whether to democratize – in which case future decisions, 
on institutional quality, will be made through the one-man-one-vote system - or to leave the 
existing political bias in place.  For simplicity, a marginal reduction of the political bias is 
ruled out here, which leads to the consideration of full democracy as the only alternative to 
the prevailing elite-ruled system.20  After the level of the political bias has been determined, 
the households make their individual budget allocation choices, in particular, making 
productive investment decisions and laying rent seeking claims against accumulated 
investment.  Finally, the level of institutional quality is determined by the political majority 
based on the first stage decision.  This level determines the institutional effectiveness of rent 
                                                          
20
 This assumption is discussed later; a very elegant general analysis of stability of political institutions is 
contained in Lagunoff, 2006a, 2006b, and requires far sightedness on behalf of the agents.  The potential 
snowball effect of democratization has been widely articulated, c.f., “Depend upon it, Sir, it is dangerous to 
open so fruitful a source of controversy and altercation as would be opened by attempting to alter the 
qualifications of voters; there will be no end of it.  New claims will arise; women will demand the vote; lads 
from twelve to twenty-one will think their rights not enough attended to; and every man who has not a farthing, 
will demand an equal voice with any other, in all acts of state.  It tends to confound and destroy all distinctions, 
and prostrate all ranks to one common level.”  (John Adams, 1776).   
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seeking claims that have been laid before.  Thus, a direct commitment to institutional quality 
is ruled out, and the individuals make individual decisions in anticipation of the political 
decision in regard to institutional quality.  Note that, in each period, bt = 0 in the case of 
democracy, or bt = b > 0, in the case of oligarchy with a political bias; it is assumed that, 
initially, b0 = b, so that the economy is elite-controlled. 
 The analysis begins with the last stage.  The preferred level of institutional quality by 
a household is determined from:21 
 - ln(rit+1) + ∫ +
−
+
+
1
0
1
1
1 )ln(1 djrr jtQjt t / ∫ −+ +
1
0
1
1
1djr tQjt  = 0 (16) 
 
and differentiation reveals that it is a decreasing function of the individual level of rent 
seeking.  The individually optimal allocation of resources has the same form as in the above 
analysis – correctly anticipating the level of Qt+1.  We can, therefore, write the first order 
condition determining the individually favored level of Qt+1 after substituting from (10) as 
follows: 
-ln(yit) + ∫ − +
1
0
1 )ln(1 djyy jtQjt t / ∫ − +
1
0
1 1djy tQjt  = - ln(yit) + µt + (1- Qt+1)σt2 = 0 (17) 
 
Comparing (15) and (17) we observe that each voter prefers a higher level of institutional quality 
when the decision is made ex ante than when it is made ex post, see also Figure 1 illustrating this 
relationship.   
  INSERT  FIGURE  1  HERE 
 
Depending on the pre-determined level of the political bias, therefore, the institutional quality is 
determined from (17) with the appropriate ydt replacing yit there.  Also note that the optimal ex 
                                                          
21
 For notational brevity we focus on internal solutions. 
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post level of institutional quality for the median income voter, yit = ymt, from (17), is the 
maximal one, Qt+1 = 1.  In this case, we calculate the equilibrium values: 
kit+1 = βyit/(1+β),  rit+1 = 0, cit = yit/(1+β), Kt+1 = βYt/(1+β); Gt+1 = Tt+1βYt/(1+β),   
 yit+1 = A εit+1 (1- Tt+1)β[βyit/(1+β)]β [Tt+1βYt/(1+β)] (18) 
 
and the resulting utility levels are: 
 uit
Dem
 = ln[yit/(1+β)] + ln {Aεit+1 (1- Tt+1)β[βyit/(1+β)]β [Tt+1βYt/(1+β)]} (19) 
 
whereas if the political bias is preserved, the utility levels are: 
 
 uit
Bias
 = ln[yit/(2-Qt+1+β)] +  
 ln {Aεit+1(1- Tt+1)β[βyit/(2-Qt+1+β)]β [(Tt+1βYt/(2-Qt+1+β)) yit 11 +− tQ / ∫ − +
1
0
1 1djy tQjt ]} (20) 
where Qt+1 is determined from 
 
 - ln(ydt) + µt + (1- Qt+1)σt2 = -(µt + btσt2) + µt + (1- Qt+1)σt2 = 0 (21) 
or, 
 Qt+1 = 1 - bt (22) 
 
In other words, Qt+1 = 1 under democratization and Qt+1 = 1 - b under the elite-controlled 
political system, so that we have 
 
Proposition 3.  There is an inverse relationship between the extent of the political bias and 
the chosen level of institutional quality.  The latter is maximal, Qt+1 = 1, in the case of 
complete democracy. 
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The welfare differential, 
 uit
Bias
 - uit
Dem
 = (2+β) ln[(1+β)/(2-Qt+1+β)] + ln [yit 11 +− tQ / ∫ − +
1
0
1 1djy tQjt ] = 
 (2+β) ln[(1+β)/(1+ b +β)] + b ln (yit) – [bµt + b 2σt2/2]  (23) 
 
increases in income implying that richer individuals tend to favor the biased political system.  
In particular, from the viewpoint of the politically decisive voter,   
 
 udt
Bias
 – udt
Dem
 = (2+β) ln[(1+β)/(1+b+β)] + b ln (ydt) – (bµt + b2σt2/2) =  
 (2+β) ln[(1+β)/(1+b+β)] + b2σt2/2  (24) 
 
which is obtained by substituting ln(ydt) from (21).  Analysis of (24) reveals that it is convex 
in b, decreasing first and increasing afterwards; further, (24) is negative for small values of b.   
This then implies that a small enough bias leads to democratization, whereas under a 
substantial bias the elite controlled system is preserved provided that income variance is 
sufficiently large. 
 Summing up, 
 
Proposition 4.  The preference by the politically decisive coalition to maintain the existing 
political bias increases with income inequality as measured by the variance of the income 
distribution; when the level of inequality is high enough, the biased system is preserved, 
whereas when it is low, democratization will prevail.  A large enough political bias implies 
preference for the biased system, and a small enough bias leads to democratization. 
 
 23  
The politically decisive voter faces a tradeoff.  On the one hand, preservation of the political 
bias – hence holding on to political power – signals poor institutional choices in the future, 
which adversely effects the individual investment decisions.  Democratization commits the 
economy to high-quality institutions, thereby enhancing investments and promoting growth; 
however, the currently decisive voter consequently loses power, hence the ability to 
appropriate a larger share of the accumulated capital.  High inequality means that the 
appropriative ability of the rich voters dominates their desire to commit to high-quality 
institutions thereby enhancing investment, and low inequality leads to the opposite outcome; 
in particular, note that if inequality is low enough, a corner solution of Qt+1 = 1 may well 
constitute the equilibrium choice. 
 
 
6. Intertemporal evolution and developmental paths 
We now proceed to study the intertemporal implications of the above analysis.  Consider first 
the case of full democratization, where the median income household is decisive.  It then 
follows from (17) that Qt+1 = 1, so that income evolves according to (18), and  
 σt+12 = β2σt2 + φ2 (25) 
 
which converges to σ*Dem2 = φ2/(1-β2); inequality increases for as long as it is below the 
steady state level and decreases when it is larger than the steady state level.22  
 Suppose now, in contrast, that the prevailing political system is biased, and that the 
level of institutional quality is determined from (22), Qt+1 = 1-b, and income variance is given 
by 
                                                          
22
 Recalling the assumption that σt2 > (2+β)/(1+β)2, this enables us to obtain a more explicit restriction on φ2: φ2 
> (2+β)(1-β)/1+β). 
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 σt+12 = (b+β)2σt2 + φ2 (26) 
 
converging in the steady state to σ*Bias2 = φ2/[1 - (b+β)2] > σ*Dem2.   
  INSERT  FIGURE  2a  HERE 
 
 Suppose first that σ*Bias2 < σI2, as depicted in Figure 2a, where the lower line 
corresponds to the evolution of income variance under democracy, and the upper line 
corresponds to the case of the political bias.  Then the economy eventually democratizes, and 
σ*Dem2 constituted the steady state level of inequality.  This, in particular, is more likely to 
happen when the political bias is small. 
 In contrast, Figure 2b depicts the case where σ*Dem2 > σI2, and the economy converges 
to the biased system – which is, for example, the case when the political bias is large enough, 
hence σI2 is small. 
  INSERT  FIGURE  2b  HERE 
 
 The most interesting case is where the bias is in the intermediate range, so that σ*Dem2 
< σI2 < σ*Bias2, as illustrated in Figure 2c.   
  INSERT  FIGURE  2c  HERE 
 
Suppose first that income inequality level is initially sufficiently high, in particular higher 
than σI2, so that (24) is positive.  Then the decisive political coalition favors the biased 
system; but this choice then leads income inequality to converge to σ*Bias2 = φ2/[1 - (b+β)2] > 
σI2.  In contrast, if income inequality is initially small enough, so that (24) is negative, 
democratization will result, and the economy will converge to σ*Dem2 < σI2.  Further, 
somewhat cumbersome but simple calculations reveal that average income growth, (14), is 
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faster in the latter steady state. 
 To summarize, 
 
Proposition 5.  If the political bias is sufficiently small, democratization will be realized in 
order to create commitment to a better institutional quality.  If the political bias is large 
enough, the biased system will remain in place.  If the bias is in the intermediate range, the 
economy’s intertemporal evolution hinges upon the initial level of income inequality.  If it is 
small, democratization will follow, with the resulting high-quality institutional choices, the 
reduction in inequality, and fast growth.  If, in contrast, it is large, then the politically 
decisive elite will hold to power, institutional quality will be poor, income inequality will be 
large, and economic growth slow. 
 
Existence of a significant political bias is a necessary condition for divergent developmental 
paths.  But the convergence to each of the two equilibria identified in the above analysis 
hinges upon the initial level of income inequality.  Thus, both political and economic 
inequalities determine the economy’s evolution: for it to remain in the bad equilibrium, both 
the political and the initial income inequality have to be large enough.  In this case, the elite 
will not find in its best interest to relinquish its power, thus sacrificing income growth and 
perpetuating low-quality institutions.  The intuition here is that a more egalitarian distribution 
of income and institutional quality may, under the indicated conditions, reinforce each other; 
and the political choice affects both. 
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7. Discussion 
The basic structure of this paper’s argument is as follows.  Political economic fundamentals – 
the extent of political bias coupled with income inequality – determine via a political process 
the degree of institutional quality that, in turn, affects the propensity to engage in wasteful 
rent seeking.  This is then the key to the economy’s evolution in terms of aggregate income 
and its distribution.  In particular economic fundamentals (in particular, income distribution) 
affect and are being affected by institutional quality. 
 We now discuss some of the main specific assumptions and the implications of the 
model.  One assumption concerns the particular sequence of events in each period whereby 
commitment to institutional quality ex ante of individual choices is ruled out.  While this 
assumption is essential for the analysis of endogenous democratization, it is much less 
important for the claim that initial inequality matters for economic growth and institutional 
development.  Consider, alternatively, the situation where the political bias is exogenously 
given (and is large) and institutional quality can be committed to prior to the individual 
allocation choices.  Analysis similar to the above reveals then that if initial inequality is high, 
a low level of institutional quality will be chosen by the decisive rich voter, generating much 
rent seeking and slow growth; further, inequality may well be reinforced.  The opposite 
happens when initial income inequality is low.  Thus, qualitatively at least, multiple 
trajectories are obtained in a similar fashion to the above (see Sonin, 2003, for a related 
analysis).  Adding the possibility of endogenous democratization, however, illustrates how 
political and economic forces interplay along these trajectories; it also contributes to a long 
standing debate in the political science literature on whether democratization is endogenous 
(see Boix and Stokes, 2003, and references therein).  Further, some interesting recent 
empirical work finds, in the context of the countries in transition, that the economy’s 
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characteristics are important determinants of the propensity to democratize, see Papaioannou 
and Siourounis, 2006, which is consistent with this paper’s focus. 
 Another assumption concerns the “warm glow” motive for parental altruism.  A richer 
model would link the generations in a more comprehensive manner, through dynastic 
altruism for example.  Analysis of such extension would likely require further restrictive 
assumptions (such as on income distribution, production technology, and the nature of the 
equilibrium).  Far-sighted members of the elite, anticipating the snowball effect of 
democratization, may then be even ore reluctant to relinquish their powers; the qualitative 
flavor of the main results is, however, unlikely to be changed. 
 Additionally, we assume that the economy enters period t with a given threshold, bt-1, 
so that it is completely characterized by this political aspect, and by the economic aspect 
represented by the prevailing income distribution.  Together, these two determine the 
distribution of political weights, hence, the identity of the decisive voter in the beginning of a 
period.  An extension stipulates the choice of bt that constitutes a majority voting equilibrium 
from the perspective of the existing political majority.  (Because the preferred identity of the 
decisive voter is monotonic in current voters’ incomes, such voting equilibrium exists and is 
given by the optimal choice from the viewpoint of the existing current decisive voter.)  As 
follows from the analysis, see Figure 1, the incentive to create a future commitment to better 
institutional quality implies then a process of a gradual democratization whereby, in each 
period, the decisive voter prefers relegation of decision making power to another, poorer 
voter.  Note, however, that by a similar logic, thus determined bt creates a new politically 
decisive coalition which, in turn, favors further relegation of political power.  In this sense, it 
is inherently unstable.  Since by assumption, b = 0 is the minimal bias, the logic inherent in 
the incentives to relegate decision making then implies that such equilibrium results in full 
democratization, i.e., one-man-one-vote system. 
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 The above model has a number of implications for development.  In a very broad 
sense, it can serve to explain the divergent paths of the West and “the rest”.  Since early 
nineteenth century the countries in the European continent and its offshoots such as in North 
America and in Australia have developed economically, instituted stable democracies, and 
reduced inequalities, whereas much of the rest of the world has remained relatively poor, 
often with autocratic or unstable regimes, and a high degree of inequalities between ruling 
elites and the masses.  A narrower – and cleaner – comparison has been presented in the work 
of Engerman and Sokoloff that studies the evolution of the New World’s colonies (see 
Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000, for a summary of this work).  It is shown there that initial 
distribution of resources had long lasting effects for the subsequent evolution of institutions 
and economic development in North America versus South America.  Easterly, 2001, 2007, 
provides a more detailed and comprehensive econometric evidence to this end, using novel 
instruments and concluding that inequality causes underdevelopment. 
 Yet another implication of the model concerns causal interpretations of institutions 
and economic fundamentals.  While there is substantial evidence that institutions cause 
development (Acemoglu et al., 2005), some work suggests that other characteristics, such as 
human capital, may be the ultimate cause of institutional quality (Glaeser et al., 2004).  Our 
analysis implies that, to the extent that an institutional trap is materialized, the two forces can 
hardly be distinguished, and that initial conditions determine the joint evolution of 
institutional quality and factor accumulation. 
 
 
8.  Concluding remarks 
This paper is motivated by high correlations among observable characteristics pertaining to 
development, such as aggregate income, political and income inequality, institutional quality, 
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and intergenerational income mobility.  It then exhibits a model whereby a mutual feedback 
between political and income inequality on the one hand and institutional quality on the other 
hand feed each other while impacting economic growth.  Initial conditions, in this view, bear 
on the subsequent economy’s evolution thus providing analytical underpinnings for the 
observations by Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000, made in the context of the historical evolution 
of the economies in the New World.23  
 Another conceptual contribution of the paper is in stressing the importance of 
economic and political fundamentals for the viability of institutional arrangements.  In this 
view, the ultimate determinants of successful performance consist not so much of the 
institutional blueprint per se as of the underlying economic structure, without which the 
blueprint may not be sustainable. 
 Several extensions of the above framework could be considered.  One extension 
concerns a more fully dynamic model.  The snowball effect of democratization may then 
deter far sighted individuals from initiating the process in the first place.  Another extension 
is related to the use of public funds.  The model assumes that they are allocated to produce a 
publicly provided good; assuming that a fraction can be allocated for redistributional 
purposes would enrich the model – but also make it somewhat less analytically tractable.  
Finally, incorporation of social norms against rent seeking could lead to additional insights as 
to the relationship between the economy's initial characteristics and its evolution (an early 
attempt in this direction was undertaken in the previous version of the paper).  This line of 
research could also provide microeconomic foundations for the concept of institutional 
quality. 
                                                          
23
 Cf., “…the initial conditions had lingering effects, not only because certain fundamental characteristics of 
New World economies were difficult to change, but also because government policies and institutions tended to 
reproduce them.  Specifically, in those societies that began with extreme inequality, elites were better able to 
establish a legal framework that insured them disproportionate shares of political power, and to use that greater 
influence to establish rules, laws, and other government policies that advantaged members of the elites relative 
to nonmembers – contributing to persistence over time of the high degree of inequality.”  
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APPENDIX 
Let wit denote the political weight of individual i in period t and let Wt denote the distribution 
of weights in period t.  Define decreases in the political bias as a transfer of weights from the 
population in a higher interval [ζ3, ζ4] to the population in a lower interval [ζ1, ζ2], ζ2 < ζ3.24  
Formally, let W and Z be two weight distributions; then W has a lower political bias than Z 
if25  
 0)]()([ ≤−∫ dxxZxW
o
ω
   for all    ω > 0 (A1)26 
 
A move from Z to W reduces political bias.  Consider now two weight functions, w(y) and 
z(y), along with the distributions of weighted incomes, G and H, respectively induced by 
them, G = F(w-1) and H = F(z-1).   It then follows from the definition of the political bias that 
w has less political bias than z if 
 ∫ ∫ ≤−=− −−
y y
dxwFzFdxxGxH
0 0
11 0)]()([)]()([  for all  y > 0 (A2) 
Then, in particular, letting yd(w) and yd(z) denote the respective weighted medians under the 
two weight functions, it follows almost immediately that yd(w) < yd(z), so that a smaller 
political bias implies that the induced distribution generates a lower median.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
24
 This is analogous to Dalton’s principle of progressive transfers from the measurement of income inequality. 
25
 We will omit time subscripts for notational brevity. 
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